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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the economic calculation debate of the 1920-30s, it is known that it is impossible to 
create a coherent balanced plan that equates supply and demand of millions of goods and 
services in the national economy, not to speak about the optimal plan. It is not well understood, 
though, how the centrally planned economy (CPE) really functioned and what were the real 
determinants of their growth rates, if not the planned indicators. It was shown that forecasts of 
growth rates based on the extrapolation of past trends were better correlated with actual 
performance than planned indicators, but it is still unclear what was the real mechanism of 
growth of CPE and what was the role of the planning process in it.  
 
The hypothesis in this paper is that the drivers of growth in the CPE were the major investment 
projects initiated by the planners. They led to shortages of supplies, which triggered creeping 
price increases for scarce goods, which in turn boosted profitability in respective industries 
allowing them to increase output. De facto it was a market economy multiplier process – fiscal 
and monetary expansion leading to the price and output increases that eventually balanced 
supply and demand.   
 
 
 
Keywords: socialist economies, central planning, economic growth, shortages, economic 
calculation problem.  
 
 
JEL: H6, O25, P34, P35, P40, P43.  
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The mystery of growth mechanism in a centrally planned economy:  
Planning process and economics of shortages 
 
Vladimir Popov 
 
«Течет вода Кубань реки, куда велят большевики» 
(“The water of Kuban river flows to where the Bolsheviks order”) 
 
The centrally planned economy (CPE) in the USSR, Eastern Europe and China disappeared before 
the economists were able to figure out how it works. Among many unresolved puzzles is the 
change in the growth rates over time: it was pretty obvious that actual growth rates deviate 
significantly from the planned targets, but there was no good explanation of why they vary from 
year to year.   
 
Wassily Leontief, the Nobel prize winner in economics, once noted that an economy using the 
profit motive but without planning is like a ship with a sail but no rudder. It may move rapidly, 
but cannot be steered and might crash into the next rock. A purely planned economy that has 
eliminated the profit motive is like a ship with a rudder but no sail. It could be steered exactly 
where one wants it to go, if only it moved (Leontief, 1974).   
 
It may well be that this comparison is not doing justice to the CPE in one respect – it could not 
be steered exactly where the planners want it to go. And why the actual growth rates deviated 
from the planned targets – sometimes more and sometimes less – still remains a mystery. It 
was shown that the planned targets do not really determine the actual growth rates –  they are 
less informative in predicting the actual outcome than simple extrapolations based on past 
trends – but it is still not clear what were the real determinants of growth process in the CPE.  
 
Teleologists,  geneticists and stylized facts 
 
An important debate unfolded on the on eve of the introduction of central planning and the 
adoption of the First five-year plan (1928-33) in the USSR between the advocates of the so 
called teleological and genetic approaches to planning. Geneticists argued that central planning 
should be constrained by economic laws, such as supply and demand, and operate within the 
constraints of proportions and potentials of national economy. Teleologists were claiming that 
proportions of the national economy could be drastically changed by the planners and desired 
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growth rates could be achieved with appropriate investment. In practical policy matters 
academic economists defending genetic approach (Nikolai Kondratiev, Vladimir Bogdanov 
and Vladimir Groman) were supported by prominent communist party leaders (Alexey Rykov 
and Nikolai Bukharin), and argued for the preservation of market trade and New Economic 
Policy (NEP), moderate growth rates, focus on light industry and agriculture. Their opponents 
– teleologists – wanted to speed up industrialization and growth rates by mobilizing the needed 
savings through rolling back NEP and harsh policies towards the peasants (low procurement 
prices for agricultural produce). This approach was developed by Stanislav Strumilin and Pavel 
Feldman, and eventually became the main party line (Gregory and Stuart, 2001).  
 
However, the accuracy of central planning was disappointing, the discrepancy between 
planned targets and actual indicators was large even for macroeconomic indicators, as the table 
below shows.  For the first five year plans (1930s-1940s) the average deviation was 39 to 58%, it 
decreased to 14-19% in the 1950-60s, but increased again to 27-31% in the 1970-80s.  
 
Table. Ratio of actual to planned growth rates of key indicators, by Five-Year Plan periods, % 
Indicator First Five-Year Plan, 
1928/29-32-33a 
Second Five-
Year Plan, 
1933-37 
Fourth Five-
Year Plan, 
1946-50 
Fifth Five-
Year Plan, 
1951-56 Initial 
variant 
Optimal 
variant 
National income produced 76 60 93 168 113 
Utilized national income      
Gross industrial output 105 87 105 152 121 
 - production of means of 
   production 
153 116 143 - 114 
 - production of objects of 
   consumption   
66 59 74 - 117 
Gross agricultural output -44 -33 25 -4 - 
Labor productivity 
 - in industry 
 - in construction 
 - in agriculture 
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106 
 
125 
62 
 
88 
82 
92 
Retail trade   32 36 127 
Real incomes   20b  111b 
Average deviation of actual 
growth rates from planned (in 
either direction), % of planned 
growth 
52 56 39 58 16 
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Indicator Seven-
Year 
Plan 
1959-65 
Eighth 
Five-Year 
Plan, 
1966-70 
Ninth Five-
Year Plan, 
1971-75 
Tenth Five-
Year Plan, 
1976-80 
Eleventh 
Five-Year 
Plan, 1981-
85 
National income produced 94 114 - - - 
Utilized national income   72 80 92 
Gross industrial output 105 103 91 67 77 
 - production of means of 
   production 
112 101    
 - production of objects of 
   consumption   
94 112    
Gross agricultural output 21 84 68 56 42 
Labor productivity 
 - in industry 
 - in construction 
 - in agriculture 
 
88 
85 
75 
 
93 
59 
87 
 
87 
78 
20 
 
55 
36 
53 
 
74 
93 
34 
Retail trade 97 120 86 84 70 
Real incomes 75 110 80 85 67 
Average deviation of actual 
growth rates from planned (in 
either direction), % of planned 
growth 
19 14 27 36 31 
a
 Planned indicators calculated by fiscal year, beginning October 1; actual rates by calendar year. 
b
 Real wages. 
Source: EKO, 1987, N.11, pp. 37-50. 
 
 
The annual planned targets deviated from the actual indicators for particular types of industrial 
output even more. In 1987 for different types of machinery and equipment in 11 out of 16 cases 
the planners were wrong in predicting even the sign of the change – they were planning the 
increase of output, but in reality there occurred a decrease (Shmelev, Popov, 1989).  
 
The results for the annual plans in volume terms for particular enterprises were especially 
frustrating. It was demonstrated that correlation coefficients between planned targets and actual 
indicators are generally not significant and, if they are significant, they are positive as often as 
they are negative (i.e. the higher the planned targets, the lower the actual production volumes).  
For 27 territorial electric energy enterprises simple extrapolation of the trend for recent 5 years 
gave a better prediction for the volume of output in the sixth year than the planned targets 
established for this sixth year. Even the extrapolation based on the actual volumes of output in 
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recent 3 years in half of all cases was more informative than the planned targets (Medvedev, 
1986).  
 
Theory and practice of central planning 
 
The theory of central planning was based on general equilibrium models (Leon Walras, Gerard 
Debreu, Kenneth Arrow) and input-output models (Wassily Leontief).  Leonid Kantorovich, 
the only Soviet economist that won the Nobel Prize (in 1975 together with an American 
Tjalling Koopmans), published in 1959 “The Best Use of Economic Resources“ (Kantorovich, 
1959), proving mathematically that not only equilibrium, but also equilibrium at the optimal 
level is theoretically possible in a static CPE.  
 
The simplified basic equation of the input-output model describes the distribution of output of 
each particular product: 



n
j
iiiijiji sIEyxax
1
,    
where xi, yi, Ei, Ii,  si - volumes of production, final consumption, export, import and change 
in stocks of i-product respectively, 
aij - input-output coefficients, i.e. inputs of i-product per unit of j-product output. 
 
Output of the product i (for instance coal) is equal to the intermediate consumption, i.e. 
consumption for production purposes) plus final consumption by households, plus net exports 
(exports minus imports), plus change in stocks. Intermediate consumption in turn is equal to the 
multiple of technological coefficients and volumes of output of other products – coal 
consumption, to continue the example, is equal to the expenditure of coal for the production of 
one kilowatt of electrical energy multiplied by the total number of kilowatts produced, plus the 
expenditure of coal for the productions of one ton of steel multiplied by the total number of tons 
of steel produced, and so forth.  
 
If n is the number of products, there is n equations with 2n unknowns (xi and yi – volumes of 
output of every single product and final consumption of these products respectively). The system 
becomes solvable, if the structure of consumption is fixed and the total consumption is 
maximized:  
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   F = ay1 + by2 + ... + wyn => max, 
where a, b, ... w - parameters, fixing the structure of final consumption. 
 
Even more so, in theory this optimal equilibrium could be attained through setting prices for 
inputs and outputs (“objectively determined valuations” – shadow prices), not through setting 
production quotas in physical units (so called “dual problem” of production planning). It was 
shown that there is one and only one set of prices that possesses the magic property – when 
these prices are assigned to products and producers are instructed to maximize profits, they are 
inevitably choosing exactly the optimal plan that was previously computed by the planners.  
The hope was that with greater capacity of computers and better techniques to manage 
unforeseen technological developments the computation of the optimal plan would become 
feasible.  
 
In practice, however, there were too many products and the costs of gathering all the necessary 
information on technological coefficients were prohibitive. Worse, there were unobservable 
variables, e.g. technological coefficients for new products and technologies, parameters of the 
changing demand function. Even if the information gathering and processing problem were 
resolved, if all technological coefficients (expenditure of i-input for the production of j-good) 
were precisely calculated and infinite size matrix could be easily inverted by super powerful 
computers, the dynamic problem still persisted.  
 
Technological coefficients tend to change and new products tend to emerge not according to a 
plan, but spontaneously, due to technical progress that is not predictable by definition. This 
was exactly the argument of Ludwig von Mises (1920) in his article "Economic Calculation in 
the Socialist Commonwealth”. It was later developed by Friedrich Hayek (1944) in “The Road 
to Serfdom” – he argued that the planners will never have enough information to carry out 
reasonable allocation of resources. In his lecture “Competition as a Discovery Procedure” he 
argued that outcomes of competition are “unpredictable and on the whole different from those 
that anyone would have been able to consciously strive for” (Hayek, 1968, p. 10). 
 
As a result, the attempt to establish billions of industrial proportions (to balance supply and 
demand for millions of goods and services for every year and month) from the centre, 
especially in a dynamic economy with unpredictable technical progress and innovations, 
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resulted in numerous deficiencies. Even with the use of input-output models and most powerful 
computers it was actually possible to develop a reasonable balanced plan for less than 1% of 
products (at the very best), for which the planners actually established production quotas in 
physical units.  
 
To add insult to injury, in the XX century there were no powerful computers and no information 
on all technological coefficients for millions of goods, so the real planning process looked 
totally different from theory. In the USSR, input-output models were developed only for 
several hundred aggregated positions (only starting from the 1960s) and used only in the pre-
planning calculations. The actual planning was carried our through so called material balances 
– supply and demand estimates for particular goods (production + imports = intermediate 
consumption + final consumption + exports + increase in stocks). Gosplan (State Planning 
Committee) was responsible for material balances for about 2,000 aggregated product groups, 
Gossnab (State Supply Committee) disaggregated these into about 15,000 positions, industrial 
branch ministries – into about 50,000 positions. Finally, each product position was sub-divided 
into 10-15 specific products at a stage of linking suppliers and users of these particular products. 
So altogether about 0.5-0.75 million items were planned, whereas 25 million varieties of goods 
were actually produced (not counting services).  
 
Whenever material balances did not add up, the bargaining process started between Gosplan, 
Gossnab, branch-industry ministries and enterprises (“could you increase the supply?”, “could 
you limit the demand?”), and whenever the iteration process of multi-phased negotiations was 
still not allowing to make the ends meet, shortages of supplies were supposed to be eliminated 
through new investment (expansion of existing and construction of new production capacities) 
and imports. Finally, the enterprises were asked to make delivery contracts with one another, 
and after these contracts were approved by the planners, they received a status of the adopted 
plan that was made into law by the supreme legislative bodies.   
 
But the plans were not fulfilled on time and pervasive shortages emerged. The hypothesis of 
this paper is that the real work mechanism of the CPE was triggered by prioritized investment 
projects that were the first to receive financing from the budget or state banks. When these 
projects created the demand for materials and supplies, shortages emerged and demand 
impulses precipitated through the rest of the economy causing increases in prices and output.  
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Structural shortages – scarce supply of some goods and excess inventories of the other goods 
– are easy to explain: these were the natural and logical consequence of the inability of the 
planners to produce a balanced plan and to set prices for millions of goods and services at the 
market clearing level (Campbell, 1958; Shmelev, Popov, 1989). But the general shortages, i.e. 
pervasive scarcity of most, if not all goods, is still a puzzle because a simple increase in prices 
could have eliminated them and helped to avoid many nuisances associated with constant 
scarcity. Even more so, that these shortages most of the time were not really significant and 
could have been eliminated by relatively modest price increases (Popov, 2020). 
 
The explanation suggested in this paper is that the growth mechanism of the CPE was based 
on cycles of creating shortages and their elimination: prioritized investment projects financed 
by the state increased the demand for labor and materials => there emerged shortages of 
materials and supplies, which resulted in creeping uncontrolled inflation for some goods and 
organized price hikes for the other => higher prices led to higher profitability => higher 
profitability allowed to finance investment and increases in production.   
 
The shortage economy did not result from soft budget constraints. It is the multiplier 
process that created and alleviated shortages  
 
Two most well-known features of the CPE – shortage economy and soft budget constraints 
(SBC), both were described initially by Janos Kornai (Kornai, 1980; Lindbeck, 2007). "In our 
day and age, – argues Grzegorz Kolodko (2018), – there is basically a consensus that in the 
case of real socialism it was the state ownership of means of production that caused the soft 
budget constraints, and these, in turn, caused inflation – more or less repressed or more or less 
open, depending on time and place, so depending on the systemic and political context".  
  
“The main finding, a conception which now forms the central maintained hypothesis of 
Kornai’s school of thought, is that the socialist economy is characterized by endemic and 
persistent shortage; moreover that this shortage is maintained over time by a variety of 
mechanisms all grounded in rational behavior by enterprises, central planners and other agents 
given their information and expectations, the constraints they experience, and the 
organizational structures which tie the system together”  (Hare, 1989). 
 
The shortage economy is believed to be connected with the soft budget constraints. Lindneck 
(2007) claimed that “Kornai’s two most celebrated characterizations of real world socialist 
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economies – “shortage economies” and production units with “soft budget constraints” – are 
analytically closely connected”.   
 
On the one hand, when the state covers the losses of the unprofitable enterprises, wages and 
profits exceed the value of output produced, so consumer and investment demand can exceed 
the supply of goods. If prices are controlled and not allowed to rise to clear the market, 
shortages emerge. This phenomenon is known also as forced savings or monetary overhang or 
delayed demand. 
 
On the other hand, enterprises themselves do not have any constraints in expanding their 
demand for resources, so shortages emerge.  “As a result of the soft budget constraint, – writes 
A. Lindbeck, – firms tend to expand investment and production until they encounter 
nonfinancial resource constraints (hence shortages). This assertion was based on the rather 
realistic assumption that managers in such economies are mainly interested in the size, or rate 
of expansion of production” (Lindbeck, 2007).  
 
Some authors, however, pointed out that the correlation between shortages and SBC is not 
inevitable, that “sufficiently high prices for consumer goods would nevertheless be able to 
abolish any consumer goods' shortages” (Gomulka, 1985), but somehow the two concepts are 
regarded as ane indispensable characterization of the socialist (centrally planned) economies 
and entered textbooks on Comparative Economic Systems.  
 
Nuti (2014) notices that Kornai himself was well aware that there were no shortages in China, 
but tended to explain it by the existence of private sector and openness to foreign trade. “But 
it might be simpler to say that shortages are not caused by the SBCs associated with socialism, 
but by prices set below market clearing, which may or may not be a necessary feature of 
socialism, and indeed in China today they are not. Even in China’s past, for a long time prices 
fixed below market clearing for a share of the quantities supplied were accompanied by 
additional supplies being available at free prices – not in black markets but under the official 
dual-track price policy typical of China” (Nuti, 2014).  
 
In reality the shortage economy is not connected at all with the soft budget constraints.  Budget 
constraints were much harder in former socialist economies than in market economies – in 
developing countries of the same level of development and even in advanced capitalist 
economies. And whenever the soft budget constraints were present in socialist economies, it 
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was industrial policy, sometimes good (export orientation in China and Vietnam), sometimes 
not so good (import substitution in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union), but definitely 
not the policy caused by inability of the state to resist the pressure from the loss-making state 
enterprises to finance their losses (Popov, 2020). 
 
The true raison d’etre for the pervasive shortages was the CPE mechanism of growth itself. 
This mechanism was associated not so much with the plan (it was physically impossible to 
create a balanced plan anyway), but with the small and big pushes to the economy that came 
from the financing of the projects that were prioritized. Such a financing started with the 
allocation of funds for capital investment from the state budget and/or credits from the state 
banks and triggered a process shown at fig. 1.   
 
 
Figure 1. How the increase in money supply leads to the increase in prices and output in 
the CPE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increase in 
revenues and 
profitability 
Increase in M 
(state credits 
or budget 
spending) 
Increase in 
enterprises 
deposits 
Increase in 
shortages 
of 
resources 
Agreement of 
buyers to 
accept higher 
prices 
(persuasive 
argument for 
the State 
Pricing 
Committee) 
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profit may go 
to investment 
fund and 
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Higher wages 
are paid to 
workers 
Increased 
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consumer 
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State Pricing 
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prices in 
retail trade 
Increase in 
profitability 
of consumer 
goods 
enterprises 
Possible 
increase in 
consumer 
goods output 
 
 
 
 
New project – say, construction of a railway or a new plant – led to the increase in demand for 
the supplies that resulted in shortages of particular materials and components. A shortage of 
supplies allowed producing plants to ask for price increases and to get an “understanding” from 
the head of construction project where supplies were needed (they knew that otherwise they 
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will not get the supplies at all), and such an “understanding” was a persuasive argument for the 
State Committee on Prices to agree to price hike.  
 
Sometimes the price increases occurred in a creeping way – via transition to the new varieties 
of products: in industries with the large and rapidly changing nomenclature of output (machine 
building, consumer goods, construction, services) introduction of the “new” product that was 
basically the same as the old one, but with few bells and whistles, was a widely used method 
of increasing prices. The calculation of the higher costs reflecting the “higher quality” was sent 
to the State Committee of Prices and eventually approved – the officials of the Committee new 
all these tricks, but were physically incapable to check millions of new calculations.   
 
In other cases, in industries that produced few varieties of products and had stable 
nomenclature (resource industries, agriculture) prices were increased by the regulator (State 
Pricing Committee) periodically in a one-time hike:  it was necessary to do it every 5-7 years 
because the creeping inflation constantly going on in other industries that delivered supplies to 
resource industries and agriculture undermined their profitability (fig. 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Price cycle and profitability cycle in industries with slowly and rapidly changing 
nomenclature of goods  
 
 
Relative prices and profitability in industries  
with rapidly changing nomenclature 
 
 
     Relative prices and profitability in  
industries with stable nomenclature  
 
 
 
 
Thus agriculture and resource industries periodically experienced the decline in their 
profitability and were even getting into red before a one-time price increase for their produce 
restored their profitability to make it comparable with the other industries (Shmelev, Popov, 
Time 
Price, 
profitability 
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1989).  As fig. 3 shows, the profitability of machine-building, light industry, construction, 
communication, and food industry in the USSR was the highest, whereas fuel and electricity, 
transportation and agriculture were low profitable.  
 
 
Figure 3. Profitability of particular industries in the USSR in 1986, % 
Source: Goskomstat.  
 
 
Price increases in both groups of industries led to the greater profitability and higher wages 
(wage fund was planned de facto as a percent of the total output and higher profits allowed to 
pay bonuses to workers), whereas higher profitability allowed to expand output because part 
of the profit could have been used for investment into the expansion of production capacities 
(fig.2).  As a result, the initial small and big impulses generated by the prioritized investment 
projects transformed themselves into price and output increases – pretty much like it happens 
in a market economy as a result of the increase in government spending and/or expansion of 
the money supply.  
 
Shortages and excess inventories were inevitable in CPE almost by definition. But it was not only 
a structural mismatch – the total value of shortages exceeded that of excess inventories. Excess 
demand created by priority investment projects in particular industries was a driving force of CPE 
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and precipitated into the rest of the economy via the multiplier process of chain increases of prices 
and output. 
 
 Capital investment was regarded as a major tool of eliminating the bottlenecks resulting from 
shortages. So capital investment was diverted to areas where new production capacities were 
needed to expand the production of scarce goods. The whole planning process thus looked like an 
endless chain of the urgent decisions forced by emergency shortages of different goods that 
appeared faster than the planners were able to eliminate them. This was a sort of a vicious circle, 
a permanent race against time, in which decisions to make capital investment were predetermined 
by existing and newly emerging shortages. And this was the transmission mechanism for the 
increase in output and prices – it was causing both, inflation and economic growth.  
 
Evidence 
 
There is a well-known relationship between the expansion of money supply and the growth of 
prices and output. Normally, the increase in the money supply is causing some growth of output 
in the first 12-18 months and then triggers the increase in prices (inflation). If the economy 
operates close to the potential (low unemployment and high capacity utilization), impulses of the 
money supply expansion are causing more inflation and less output growth, but in case of the 
large output gap (between potential and actual output), there is a good chance to expect that money 
supply impulse would result predominantly in output growth, not in inflation. In any case, ceteris 
paribus (or to be more precise, in the absence of changes in money velocity), increase in the 
money supply is exactly equal to the increase in output in current prices, which in turn is equal to 
the sum of growth and inflation. Fig. 4 confirms that the money velocity is in fact quite stable – 
in the US in the 1960-80s the fluctuations of the growth rates of money supply were very much 
in line with the fluctuations of the growth rates of GDP in current prices.  
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Figure 4.   US money supply and GNP, annual growth rates,% 
 
Source: Economic Report of the President.  
 
 
 
It may be surprising to see the same relationship in the CPEs – planning of the money supply was 
carried out by the State Bank (Gosbank), planning of prices – by State Committee on Prices 
(Goskomtsen), planning of output – by the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and branch-
industry ministries, and yet, in 1-2 years, these indicators fell into the relationship typical for the 
market economy. Growth rates of the national income in current prices in the USSR in the 1960s-
80s, sometimes without the lag and sometimes with a lag of 1 year, reflected the fluctuations of 
the growth rates of most important component of money supply – deposits of enterprises (fig. 5). 
And the variations in the growth rates of enterprises’ deposits with a lag of about one year led to 
the fluctuations in wages growth rate (fig. 6).  Finally, growth rates of personal deposits were quite 
correlated with the growth rates of retail sales – again, with a one-year lag (fig. 7).  
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Figure 5. Enterprises deposits and national income in current prices, annual growth 
rates,% 
 
Source: Goskomstat.  
 
Figure 6. Money supply and wages, annual growth rates,% 
 
Source:  Goskomstat.  
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Fig. 7. Personal bank deposits and retail sales in current prices, annual growth rates, % 
Source:  Goskomstat.  
 
 
This relationship between the growth of money supply and growth of prices and output, and 
increase in wages and retail sales confirms in the first approximation the hypothesis about 
growth mechanism in the CPE:  when money supply expands due to increased financing of 
particular investment projects, there are automatic mechanisms at play to transmit the initial 
impulse into other industries, so it causes the increase in prices, output and wages.  
      
Conclusions 
 
Centrally planned economy (CPE) is sometimes characterized as an antonym of a market 
economy, but this is not true. The ability of the central planning authority to develop and 
implement a coherent balanced plan for the national economy (not even to speak about the 
optimal plan) is limited and hence the vacuum is being filled with the automatic mechanisms 
of self-regulation that are in essence similar to the market adjustment process. In particular, 
fiscal and monetary shocks in the CPE lead to the increase in output and prices, very much like 
the fiscal and monetary impulses in the market economy. The mechanism of the transmission 
of these impulses implies the emergence of shortages due to the launch of small and big 
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investment projects and the elimination of these shortages through largely self-propelled 
process of price and output increases. Initial investment led to shortages of supplies, which 
triggered creeping price increases for scarce goods, which in turn boosted profitability in 
respective industries allowing them to increase output. De facto it was a market economy 
multiplier process – fiscal and monetary expansion leading to the price and output increases 
that eventually balanced supply and demand.   
 
Such an interpretation explains the large gap between the planned targets and actual indicators. 
Even though it was demonstrated that the growth rates of the CPE are not really determined by 
the planners and planned targets, it was not really clear, what are the true determinants of the 
variations of growth rates. This paper argues that the planners influenced the development of 
the national economies not so much via adopting the planned targets, but by choosing the 
investment projects to be launched first. The financing of these projects gave impulses to the 
other industries via multiplier process that triggered either price increases or output increases, 
depending on the gap between the potential and actual output, very much like in a market 
economy.  
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